Institute for Historical Justice and Reconciliation

Israeli-Palestinian reconciliation is a theme of a Czech film festival that began on 25 July, according to a recent article from the Prague Daily Monitor. Many of the films being shown examine the shared narratives of the conflict. Refer to the link for the whole story.

Events such as this film festival can be powerful tools in promoting reconciliation between different groups. Television and film are large sources of information for young people. Furthermore, festivals, and other positive sources of televised information geared towards younger viewers are able to respond to many of negative sources of information that children are exposed to. A recent ABC news story reported on a Hamas television children's show that allegedly encourages its viewers to commit martyrdom. The article also discussed how some of these Hamas cartoons has exacerbated tensions between Hamas and Fatah.

This film festival and investigation of negative television shows occur just as inter-Palestinian tensions may be increasing. Earlier today, AFP Press reported that Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas' security forces arrested 50 members of Hamas. Some have suggested that this is in response to an earlier incident in which Hamas forces arrested 300 members of Abbas' Fatah party. A security official of Abbas "declined to say" whether the incidents were connected. If the situation worsens between the two parties, Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in the near future will undoubtedly become more difficult.

While Robert Musil may have written that “the most remarkable thing about monuments is that no one notices them,” this is not the case during times of political unrest or when there is a perceived (or desired) rupture in historical time. The creation (or destruction) of memorials and monuments is always intimately bound up in power relations, and battles over history, identity, and authority are often played out in the memorial landscape of a country.

This is the case that we are currently seeing in Estonia. A Soviet-era World War II memorial has been the symbolic source of diplomatic tensions between Estonia and Russia for months. The attempted removal of this memorial just over a month ago sparked violent protests on the streets that killed at least one person and severely disrupted diplomatic relations between Estonia and Russia. Estonia gained independence from Russia in 1991 and has been a member of both NATO and the EU since 2004. The monument was erected by Russians in 1947 to commemorate the end of World War II and Russia’s victory over Nazi Germany. The desire to remove the monument was, as the New York Times reported, seen by Russia and Estonians of Russian descent as blasphemous and even tantamount to the glorification of Nazism.

Estonia’s increasing integration into the EU and alignment with Western Europe and also the proposed American missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic has allowed Russia to use “the fate of the monument …as a proxy for broader grievances with the United States and NATO generally.” (New York Times April 28). As Russia’s parliament called for the severing of relations or the imposition of sanctions on Estonia, thousands of people began launching what is now being called the first full cyber war on Estonia. (New York Times article May 29th) The attacks began on April 26 and have since grown in intensity. Well-organized plans for attacks on May 9th, Russians “Victory Day” (celebrating the end of World War II) were carried out, increasing internet traffic flow in Estonia to over 1000 times its normal rate and shutting down government and financial sites. While the attacks have come from as far as the US and Vietnam, it is widely believed in Estonia to be an assault by the Russian government.

The political appropriations of memorials and commemorative dates show how intimately memorials are tied to power relations and the symbolic presentation of a country’s national narrative (even in this case, where the memorial stands in a different country). Why is this particular monument the source of such controversy? Internal debates, such as the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities’ place in Estonia certainly play a role. On another scale, it surely has a lot to do with Russia’s intention to assert what as seen as its moral victory in World War II and also justify their long-time presence in their former territory. Many Estonians wish to symbolically sever their country’s ties with its former occupier as they move ever closer to the New Europe. One of the most time-honored ways of doing this is to dismantle memorial sites belonging to the old regime.

This particular case makes strikingly evident the fact that the memory and narratives of both the Second World War and the Cold War still carry enormous significance in the politics of history and memorialization today.

Report from May 29, 2007: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html?pagewanted=1&hp

An article appeared recently in the Sueddeutsche Zeitung (15 March 2007) on the occasion of German Chancellor Andrea Merkel’s planned visit to Poland and in light of the increasing tension between the two countries regarding historical issues. The author of this article, a professor of Polish and Ukrainian studies at the European University Viadrina, wrote: “For many years, misunderstandings and accusations have plagued the relationship between Germany and Poland…” The effects of these misunderstandings and accusations function on a number of levels, from high politics to handball matches (as was the example in the article). While it is of course important to combat problems on all levels (including dispelling simple myths and stereotypes about Polish car thieves) in order to help normalize relations between Germans and Poles, there are very serious historical issues which need to be confronted if the long and arduous process of reconciliation begun in the nineties between the two countries is to continue.

The author of the article feels that at this point the escalating situation threatens not only the political relationship between Germany and Poland, but also the future of EU integration and the creation of a European Constitution as well. The fact that many of the new member states in the European Union are not only seen but are also treated as “second class citizens” just adds fuel to the still-smoldering embers that remain in the ashes of World War II – causing “old” problems to flare in the face of new ones. But this is not surprising as many scholars have long argued that the debates over history and memory between the old member states of the EU and the acceding ones needed to be thoroughly played out before the new members joined the Union where the “fraternal atmosphere” of the bodies of the EU would make it more difficult to negotiate these histories. The illusion that these problems would somehow dissipate with increasing European integration has proven false. Quite to the contrary, the “old” issues seem not to be fading with the passing of time, but to be taking on new forms and growing in importance.

In both Germany and Poland, (as well as elsewhere in Europe) historical themes are being used as ammunition in political campaigns, bringing battles of history and memory into the arena of politics where contentious issues have an even greater chance of being distorted and manipulated to serve political purposes. A politician’s flippant use of past instances of injustice or violence as accusatory and pejorative cannon fodder leads only to the proliferation of many of the same myths historians and other academics have long been trying to dispel. Not only are these myths being perpetuated by the politicians, but political rallying cries for confessions of guilt for past crimes obscure the fact that so many of these past crimes have been and are currently being dealt with by academics in the respective country. The author of the article points out for example that many German politicians are currently calling on Poland to admit the unjust way the ethnic Germans were expelled from Poland even though Polish historians have long been working under this premise. This particular issue is much too complex to discuss here, but its presence in political discourse and the discussion about Polish-German relations in general shows the ever-increasing gap between the academic and political realms when it comes to the “shared histories” of countries in Europe today.

One of the positive effects of the growing tendency toward the universalization of Holocaust themes is the increasing recognition of other injustices based on racism, xenophobia and civil rights abuses. For example, it seems that it has recently become difficult to speak of the historical injustices committed against Jews in Germany without in the same breath also recognizing contemporary injustices committed against minorities, particularly Turks, in Germany today. However, when this equation is flipped – and the specter of the Jewish past in Germany is evoked as political and moral capital to be used to fight contemporary injustice against minority groups in Germany today – it becomes much more problematic. While these connections are certainly more imagined than historical, they are nonetheless shaping the nature of Turkish-Jewish relations in Germany (and abroad) as well as affecting the politics of integration and inclusion in Germany. While a growing awareness of contemporary injustice is of course something positive, when certain parallels are drawn between the situation of the Jews in Germany in the past and the Turks in Germany in more recent years, tensions rise and the potential for political and emotional fallout becomes high.

As one of the few scholars who work on the (albeit limited) interactions between Turks and Jews in Germany, Jeffrey M. Peck raises many of the complex issues regarding these groups in his recently published book Being Jewish In the New Germany (2006). In the chapter specifically covering this topic he writes: “In fact, to many Germans, the Turks have become ‘the new Jews’” (p.90). He then explores what this statement means through a discussion of the parallels and complexities of the Turkish-Jewish, Turkish-German, and German-Jewish relationships in Germany. While Peck for the most part objectively explores these relationships from historical and sociological perspectives, it is obvious that as the “Turkish Question” and the “Jewish Question” in Germany become more intimately intertwined in academic scholarship and popular media, problems arise that are potentially damaging to either or both groups. A recent example of a counter-productive coupling of the “Turkish/Jewish Questions” was at the otherwise productive conference entitled “Immigration and Cultural Exchange – German Jewish Presences in the U.S. and Post Cold War Germany” sponsored jointly by NYU and the Leo Baeck Institute (March 25-27, 2007).

The final panel of the conference was entitled “Jewish, Turkish, German: Cross-Cultural Perspectives” and was intended to be a forum to expand the themes present in the conference to encompass another minority group and to foster collaboration between people working on issues of immigration and integration in Europe and the United States. The panel was selected and chaired by Almut Wieland-Karimi from the Fredrich Ebert Foundation and included the journalist Cem Sey, anthropologist Koser Akcapar, and sociologists Göçe Yurdakul and Michael Bodemann. Each speaker presented, along with his or her own intended topic, many of the difficulties of attempting to broach this topic, especially in such a homogenous forum.

Most of the scholars on the panel quickly admitted that they “knew absolutely nothing about Jews” before being invited to the conference, and were strained to quickly find some sort of connection to talk about; an issue which led to bizarre (and for many members of the mostly Jewish audience offensive) historical and contemporary comparisons between Turks and Jews. These ranged from the direct comparison of the Turkish situation in Germany today to that of the Jews in 1938, to declarations of current Turkish solidarity with Jews because “the Jews are being attacked by Palestinian terrorists while the Turks are being attacked by Kurdish terrorists” as well as many other less-than-academic comments. The Turkish-Armenian issue was also never mentioned, which caused some members of the audience to immediately discredit the speakers and the other issues that had been raised. A full discussion of the panel is not possible here, but it is worth mentioning that the thread that seemed to run through each lecture was how the Turkish community in Germany directly instrumentalizes the Holocaust and the “shared Jewish-Turkish narrative of injustice” to achieve political goals – a blatantly taboo subject for most members of the audience but a candid declaration by the speakers.

The nature of this forum seemed to force the ahistorical comparison of victimhood and suffering of two very different groups, something Peck explicitly warns against in his book. In the context of the Turkish trend to compare the violent acts committed against Turks in Germany between 1989 and 1992 with Kristallnacht (and even the entire Holocaust) Peck wrote simply, “When comparisons are taken out of context, they threaten to overshadow the injustices of both historical epochs.” (p.105). This threat became a reality during this final panel of the conference. If it had been done differently, it could have been the perfect platform to increase the highly prestigious audience’s awareness of the difficult situation for Turks currently living in Germany. It could have created the unique opportunity to explore potential routes of cooperation in scholarship and/or society between Turks and Jews. It could have possibly even begun to forge some sort of solidarity between the American and German Jews (and other scholars and students present) and the Turks who are currently working on difficult historical and contemporary issues in a post-9-11 atmosphere that weighs so heavily on Jewish–Muslim (and American-Muslim) relations in general and is often hostile to collaboration and scholarship on such subjects. Instead, it proved the danger inherent in attempts to instrumentalize shared narratives of injustice, suffering, and victimhood instead of proving the possibilities that could come from such attempts.

On November 13, the UN “Alliance of Civilizations” presented its report in Istanbul to Kofi Annan. The panel of 20 high level individuals calls for the appointment of a new High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations, with a new UN office and bureaucracy. It has many good recommendations, on politics, education, communication and media, immigrations, and foremost mutual respect between the civilizations.

The BBC summarized the report: “The chief causes of the rift are not religion or history, they say, but recent political developments, notably the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”

The Alliance of Civilizations report argues for the writing of shared historical narratives as an approach to conflict resolutions, the very essence of the IHJR work.

The Report states:

"IV. THE POLITICAL DIMENSION Historical Narratives 4.1 Building on the efforts of the Dialogue Among Civilizations 3 and other related initiatives 4, the Alliance of Civilizations must examine - within a multi-polar and comprehensive approach - the state of relations between diverse contemporary societies, their world-views and the reciprocal perceptions that shape these relations. The analysis here focuses on relations between Western and Muslim societies though the approach taken by the High-level Group to this issue may serve as a reference for the bridging of other divides in the interest of establishing peace and harmony.

4.3 Selective accounts of ancient history are used by radical movements to paint an ominous portrait of historically distinct and mutually exclusive faith communities destined for confrontation. Such distorted historical narratives must be countered. More important for the purposes of this report is the fact that this history does not offer explanations for current conflicts or for the rise in hostility between Western and Muslim societies. On the contrary, the roots of these phenomena lie in developments that took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, beginning with European imperialism, the resulting emergence of anti-colonial movements, and the legacy of the confrontations between them."

[Presenting an overview of the historical reasons and manifestations for the animosity between the civilizations, the report states:]

"4.10 These reciprocal perceptions of double standards contribute to the climate of suspicion and mistrust that undermines relations between Muslim and Western societies."

[Focusing on the Middle East, the report argues]

"5.4 Achieving a just and sustainable solution to this conflict requires courage and a bold vision of the future on the part of Israelis, Palestinians and all countries capable of influencing the situation. We firmly believe that progress on this front rests on the recognition of both the Palestinian and Jewish national aspirations and on the establishment of two fully sovereign and independent states living side by side in peace and security."

SHARED NARRATIVES

The most intriguing part is the introduction into an official conflict resolution methodology the construction of shared narratives. In a conflict that is the core dispute in the world, where real conflict of interests have been elevated to a symbolic chasm between the West and the Muslim world, the report challenges politicians and civil society to provide a new frame of understanding the conflict. This has to engage the accepted view that the past is a combination of “reality” with “imagined” and “invented” narratives. This construction of identity has to be taken on with the explicit purpose of assisting to the resolution of the conflict.

In its section "V. TOWARDS AN ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS: GENERAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, The Middle East" We find the following

"5.6 Of primary importance in this regard is the mutual recognition of the competing narratives that emerged following the establishment of the state of Israel. In the eyes of most Jews and Israelis this event was the result of a long-standing aspiration to build a Jewish homeland and was immediately followed by an attack from neighboring Arab countries. For Palestinians and a majority of people in the Muslim world, however, the establishment of Israel was experienced as an act of aggression that led to the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and to the occupation of their lands. It is worth noting that these competing narratives are mirrored in divergent interpretations of recent history: different ways of describing conflicts, occupation, and peace negotiation efforts.

5.7 A White Paper on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The competing narratives of Palestinians and Israelis cannot be fully reconciled, but they must be mutually acknowledged in order to establish the foundations of a durable settlement. To this end we recommend the development of a White Paper analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict dispassionately and objectively, giving voice to the competing narratives on both sides, reviewing and diagnosing the successes and failures of past peace initiatives, and establishing clearly the conditions that must be met to find a way out of this crisis. Such a document could provide a firm foundation for the work of key decision-makers involved in efforts to resolve this conflict. A level-headed and rational analysis would make it clear to the Palestinian people that the price of decades of occupation, misunderstanding and stigmatization is being fully acknowledged, while at the same time contributing to exorcize the fears of Israelis. This effort would strengthen the hand of those who seek a just solution to this conflict while weakening extremists on all sides, as they would no longer be the champions of a cause they have been able to appropriate because its story had been left untold or deliberately ignored by the community of nations."

When the report states that the narratives “cannot be fully reconciled but they must be mutually acknowledged” it sets a standard for understanding, not erasing the justified diverged, even polarized histories.

A shared narrative, however, does not need to be a single perspective, but will most likely be one of mutual acknowledgment and inclusion of alternative participants and parties in a joint history. Indeed, it is this acknowledgment that is the history. We would not ordinarily speak of political or social rivalry within a nation as two different histories, as much as one history with different perspectives.

The Alliance of Civilization – to be known in UN lingo as UNAOC – certainly at the very least brings new attention to historical narratives as a methodology of conflict resolutions. Hopefully also to conflict resolution itself.